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Lear Corporation, a corporation that supplies automotive interior systems, met with Carl Icahn. The board formed a committee that allowed the CEO to negotiate with Icahn about selling the company to Icahn.
The merger agreement contained a 45-day go-shop period. Lear could actively solicit interest from third parties and gave Ichan a match right. No bids emerged during the go-shop period.
The Chancery Court held that because the Lear CEO was the negotiator with Icahn, the proxy should have disclosed the CEO's negotiations about his retirement benefits. From the Chancery Court: a reasonable stockholder would want to know an economic motivation of the negotiator employed by a board to obtain the best price for the stockholders, when that motivation could rationally lead the negotiator to favor a deal at a less than optimal price, because the procession of a deal was more important to him, given his overall economic interest, than only doing a deal at the right price.








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