The following is for information purposes, and not meant to be legal advice.
The U. S. Supreme Court interpreted Congress’ objective in the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (the “Act”) to be to achieve equality of employment opportunities and to remove barriers that favored white employees. It stated that under the Act, practices or tests neutral on their face and in intent, cannot be maintained if they operated to “freeze” the status quo of prior discriminatory employment practices.
The Act proscribed overt discrimination, and practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation. If an employment practice that operates to exclude certain races, cannot be shown to be related to job performance, the practice is prohibited. In Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 91 S. Ct. 849 (1971), defendant’s high school completion and intelligence exam requirements did not demonstrate any relationship to successful job performance. Employees who did not meet the requirements, and were allowed to stay, continued to perform satisfactorily. The promotion record suggested that the requirements were not needed for advancement. The Court also recognized that blacks received inferior education in segregated schools, and as a consequence, were less able than whites to meet the requirements. The Court stated that even the absence of discriminatory intent did not redeem employment procedures that are unrelated to measuring job capability and that operated to exclude minorities.
The U.S. Supreme Court has silently overruled Griggs in its subsequent applications of the rationale that employers who apply objective, neutral criteria in hiring and promotion may be guilty of unintentional discrimination if such neutral standards have a disproportionate impact on an identified group.
In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 806, 83 S.Ct. 1817, 1826 (1973), the Court held that Griggs was inapplicable if there is no proof that an employment procedure is being applied discriminatorily.
In City of Los Angeles Department of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 710, 98 S.Ct. 1370, 1376 (1978), the Court held that even a neutral practice may inevitably result in disproportionate impact, and that the Court did not hold in Griggs that discrimination must always be inferred from such a consequence. Discriminatory intent, not mere impact, is required to challenge an employment practice. Griggs is not applicable to hold a defendant liable for unintentional discrimination. The Griggs rationale applies when an employment practice, adopted without a deliberate discriminatory motive, results in intentional discrimination in operation.
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